THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director for National Foreign Assessment
C. Ames
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Officer for Near East and South SCC Meeting ofSecurity Framework"
Requested. None; the following is for your inforaatloo. 00
This was the eleventheries of SCC meetingsSecurity Framework for the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean. The twoamphibious exerclsea in the region and Saudi financialregional security, were supplementediscussion of thsa possible^ Ethiopian Invasion of Somaliaomali-US^
Exercises. The recommendation* in the State paparhave our ambassadors in Egypt and Kenya approach these two1 Juneequestoint amphibious exercise wasnoted that we should not overburden Egyptong list ofat one time. DoD assured State that tha MAU exercise had topwould be handled first and separately! State also noted thst Kenya
useaartial re-wem
request to the President for support against Libya. sis
an
The kev questions
ws jsrrsrsrsiff'
may prefer an Inland exercise la an area formerly used by themight lessen the regional Impact. DoD noted that tha MAU woulda joint exercise in Spain during the periodBrzezinskl noted that the President would be visiting Spain duringand wanted to look Into the possibilities of demonstrations orof these coincidental events. Lastly, DoD noted thatexercise was planned for Tunisia duringuly timethought this might be usedartial response toto th*
are, should weAU exerciseacilities. should wo stretch agreement talks out butAU exercise aa an interim deterrent to the Ethiopians, or should we sign first then have an exercise. State was against any exercise as long as the situation was hot, believingS show of force would only make Siad bolder (but not stronger) and prove to Siad how valuable we thought he was and cause him to up the agreement ante. DoD and NSC, ln what eventually was the prevailing view, stated that they believed we should go for an agreement soonest (while Siad is nervous) then goAU exercise to show the Ethiopians and their friends we mean business. The Ogaden caveats would be in the agreement. If Siad got in trouble over his Ogaden ventures, that would be his problem. If, however,marched toward
Ambassador
Peterson will be in next week and there will be an SCC to work out Aaron asked for^reassessment of what the Soviets wouldln the eventbut this was not levied as a
requirement. (S)
presentation should the Saudis, in aggregate form, what we andsk what the Saudis ar* prepared to eed_belf
DoD believed that Brown should make the above pitch during his meeting with Sultan, but this idea was not accepted. Fahd is the on*should talk to and Brown is not seeing Fahd. Cen. Jones noted that the question ofs will remain an impediment to any meaningful discussion with the Saudis. Briezinski recognized this and noted thats would probably be discussed at th* President'say) breakfast.
Next Meeting. No date was provided for the next oeeting, but two key Items will be Somalia and5 package. *m9
Comment. Except for the discussion on Somalia, which was one of the best in this series ofound the meeting drifting and lacking focus. ontinue to be disturbed at the lackoherent approach
to the Saudis. Obviously we shouldalking princ icludlng the arms issues.
our policy toward "therms, security, petroleum, aid to Pakist ettlement,ustommon thread: what are we trying t_ accomplish In the region end how will this involve our friends. Mi
Roberc C. Ames
Original document.
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